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Article 
Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in 
Information Production, Past and Future 
Amy Kapczynski† 
  INTRODUCTION   
These are challenging times for the Food and Drug Admin-
istration. Congress passed a so-called right-to-try law in May 
2018, sharply limiting the Agency’s oversight of the use of exper-
imental drugs.1 Nearly the only thing the lame duck Congress 
could agree upon in 2016 was that the FDA should lower its reg-
ulatory standards to speed drugs to market.2 The resulting 21st 
Century Cures Act urges the Agency to approve drugs with less 
evidence, but gives the Agency no significant new tools to ensure 
that companies produce adequate data after a drug enters the 
market.3 The Agency also faces profound challenges in the 
courts. Drug companies have successfully leveraged recent de-
velopments in commercial free speech doctrine to call into ques-
tion the constitutionality of the Agency’s restrictions on drug 
marketing, particularly regarding unapproved (off-label) uses of 
approved drugs.4  
Proponents argue that these developments will yield better, 
faster access to cures. For the most part, these proposed changes 
 
†  Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Faculty Co-Director, Global Health 
Justice Partnership; Faculty Co-Director, Collaboration for Research Integrity 
and Transparency Copyright © 2018 by Amy Kapczynski. 
 1. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel-
lina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018). 
 2. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 3. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” Leg-
islation: Speed and Ease vs. Science, 317 JAMA 581, 581 (2017). 
 4. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
the government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, construe the mis-
branding provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to criminalize off-label 
speech itself ); Amarin Pharma v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(holding that drug companies have a commercial speech right to make off-label 
claims that are not false or misleading and barring the FDA from using such 
speech as evidence of misbranding). 
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are instead likely to put patients in danger and lead to wasteful 
spending. To understand why, we first need a shared under-
standing of the central purpose of the FDA’s regulation of drug 
marketing. That mission is commonly described as paternalistic 
in nature: via pre-market review, the FDA protects us from un-
safe medicines. Another prominent view asserts that the justifi-
cation for the FDA’s regulatory power comes from information 
asymmetries between consumers and companies: by certifying 
the quality of medicines, the FDA helps consumers make good 
choices. Both of these arguments have come under sustained at-
tack recently, the first from certain patients’ groups and con-
servative advocacy groups that object to the paternalism it im-
plies, and the second from scholars and advocates who believe 
that decentralized certification would be more efficient.  
Neither of these two visions provides the best justification 
for the FDA’s regulatory power over the marketing of medicines. 
As Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested, the FDA in its modern 
form aims primarily to address a problem of information produc-
tion.5 The core function of the FDA as a drug regulator, as I will 
elaborate below, is not to make choices for the public, or to certify 
the truth, but to generate and validate information about medi-
cines. 
We need the FDA to play this role because it is, quite simply, 
extraordinarily hard to know whether something is or is not a 
cure. By controlling marketing, the FDA targets a distortion in-
herent to systems that rely on the profit motive and patents to 
generate clinical trial data: it encourages the creation of high-
quality evidence about medicines that is not biased toward posi-
tive results. (By “positive” I mean results that appear to favor 
the safety or efficacy of the drug.) Critically, the Agency also val-
idates evidence about medicines—an activity that is more inten-
sive than what is implied by the term certification. Evaluating 
the qualities of drugs, as I will describe, has very little in com-
mon with rating hotel rooms or warrantying used cars. A typical 
FDA new drug review involves hundreds of thousands of pages 
of data, and may require reviewers to rerun data analyses, to 
query companies for more information, and to closely scrutinize 
individual trial records. Validation of the results of drug trials 
requires significant expertise, significant resources, and access 
to all of the relevant clinical trial data. While markets sometimes 
 
 5. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007). 
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produce viable third-party certifiers, they cannot produce ade-
quate third-party validators, absent major interventions that ef-
fectively turn third parties into smaller, independent versions of 
regulatory agencies. 
In the pages that follow, I first aim briefly to explain these 
claims in more detail and show that the most persuasive justifi-
cation for the FDA’s modern regulatory approach stems from the 
enormous challenges associated with producing and validating 
high-quality information about medicines. The point is underap-
preciated both in the academic literature and in policy debates, 
and is critical to understanding the problems with the recent 
challenges to the FDA’s drug regulatory authority that are 
sketched above. Such changes might bring compounds more 
quickly to patients. But they also plausibly could bring about a 
world where we know less and less about the medicines we put 
in our bodies. 
Understanding the FDA’s information production role, I’ll 
show, allows us to see more clearly the danger of immensely pop-
ular right-to-try laws. It also helps highlight the grave dangers 
of emerging First Amendment law that asks judges rather than 
regulators to determine what is true about a drug. Finally, the 
information production lens also clarifies the stakes of the FDA’s 
implementation of the 21st Century Cures Act. In particular, it 
makes plain that the implementation of that Act must be pre-
ceded by a much more complete account of the reliability of reg-
ulatory decisions made on accelerated timelines and with less 
evidence. Any move to lower regulatory standards should also be 
avoided until we have a better understanding of why postmar-
keting study requirements are so rarely fulfilled in a timely fash-
ion, and until FDA has the resources and authority needed to 
alter this fact.  
I.  THE FDA’S INFORMATION PRODUCTION FUNCTION   
Since the 1960s, the FDA has exerted profound regulatory 
power over new medicines.6 The Agency exercises that power 
primarily by controlling drug marketing. No company may pro-
mote any new drug—or any existing drug for a new use—without 
first providing “substantial evidence” of the safety and efficacy 
 
 6. For a description of the unusual power of the FDA as a U.S. regulatory 
body, and a sweeping history of the development of the Agency’s powers, see 
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010). 
 2360 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2357 
 
of that medicine for a specific use.7 This premarket review sys-
tem was refined over many decades, and has had a profound 
global influence.8  
Key developments in the drug regulatory process typically 
have followed from highly publicized tragedies. The most salient 
was the thalidomide disaster.9 Used to prevent morning sickness 
in pregnancy, the drug caused thousands of children in Europe 
and Australia to be born without limbs, or to suffer other forms 
of organ damage or even death.10 The United States was largely 
spared because of the stubborn—now legendary—refusal of FDA 
reviewer Dr. Frances Kelsey to approve the marketing of the 
drug in this country.11 The event deeply shaped the public’s per-
ception of the Agency, and helped justify significant expansions 
in its regulatory authority.12 It is therefore not surprising that 
the FDA’s purpose is commonly described first and foremost in 
paternalistic terms, as a project of protecting consumers from 
dangerous products.13 
 
 7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2001) (prohibiting the marketing of a new drug prior 
to FDA approval); id. § 355(d) (requiring drug sponsors to provide “substantial 
evidence” of a drug’s safety and effectiveness with respect to the specific use in 
the proposed labeling and defining “substantial evidence” as “evidence consist-
ing of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investiga-
tions”). Accordingly, if a drug sponsor wishes to add a new use to an existing 
drug’s label, the sponsor must conduct studies that demonstrate the drug’s 
safety and efficacy for the proposed new use. 
 8. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 687 (noting that “the FDA influence[s] . . . 
international politics and [the] political economy of pharmaceuticals more than 
any other regulatory Agency,” and “has become a setter of standards for tech-
nological, scientific, economic, and cultural development in medicine”). The 
Agency also has had profound influence over modern practices of evidence-based 
drug development. For example, it was FDA regulators that invented the famil-
iar stages of clinical trial development. Id. at 278–80, 292–95; see also Richard 
A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1777–82 (1996) (describing the FDA’s oversight of clinical trial 
design for pharmaceutical research and its development of requirements and 
guidelines for clinical trials). 
 9. CARPENTER, supra note 6.  
 10. Id. at 119. 
 11. Id. at 242–48. 
 12. See id. at 238–45 (describing the public impact of the thalidomide ex-
ample); id. at 230 (describing the link between the tragedy and the 1962 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments as well as the 1963 Investigational New Drug 
Amendments). Advocates for reform used the averted tragedy to argue that the 
system could not over the long term rely on the heroism of individual reviewers 
but needed structural changes—for example, to remove the default rule that a 
drug was approved after sixty days absent objections. Id. at 254. 
 13. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the 
Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (describing 
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This paternalistic justification has been sharply criticized in 
recent years. Patients with grave diseases, libertarian critics, 
and conservative think tanks have all argued that the govern-
ment has no business protecting people from risks that they wish 
to take.14 The power of this critique is exemplified by the recent 
wave of so-called right-to-try laws, which passed in forty 
states,15 and very recently into federal law. These laws seek to 
make it easier for patients to access unapproved drugs.16 Though 
they differ in their details, the state laws typically purport to 
permit manufacturers to market unapproved drugs to termi-
nally ill patients, and immunize companies from liability for any 
adverse effects.17 They had little practical effect, because their 
main provisions were preempted by federal FDA law.18 Now, 
however, Congress has adopted a similar law at the federal level, 
 
the conventional account that “drug regulation is essentially paternalistic be-
cause it seeks to protect the misinformed consumer from better-informed 
sellers”); see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 1776 (describing one perception of the 
FDA’s post-1962 role as a gatekeeper that prevents harmful or ineffective drugs 
from entering the market); What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo (last visited June 18, 2018) (“The Food and Drug Administration is 
responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and 
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical de-
vices . . . .”). 
 14. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 367–68 (describing the objection that 
“patients may be harmed by disease as well as by drugs,” and the role of patient 
advocates in criticizing this justification); see also Richard A. Epstein, Against 
Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of Cancer 
Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2009) (providing a libertarian critique); 
Karlyn Bowman & Joseph Kosten, From the Archives: Pharmaceuticals, the 
FDA, and the Drug Lag, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.aei 
.org/publication/from-the-archives-pharmaceuticals-the-fda-and-the-drug-lag 
(criticizing the FDA for delaying access to new drugs purportedly being used to 
effectively treat patients in other countries). 
 15. According to the Goldwater Institute, the main proponent of the right-
to-try movement, forty states had right-to-try laws, as of June 2018. Goldwater 
Inst., Right to Try in Your State, RIGHT TO TRY, http://www.righttotry.org/in 
-your-state (last visited June 18, 2018); see generally DARCY OLSEN, THE RIGHT 
TO TRY: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PREVENTS AMERICANS FROM GET-
TING THE LIFESAVING TREATMENTS THEY NEED (2015) (describing the Goldwa-
ter Institute’s role in promoting these laws). 
 16. Goldwater Inst., About Right to Try, RIGHT TO TRY, http://www 
.righttotry.org/about-right-to-try (last visited June 18, 2018) (advocating for 
right-to-try laws on these grounds). 
 17. Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to 
Try Law Provisions and Implications, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 
170, 170–71, 174 (2017) (noting variations and commonalities among state 
right-to-try laws). 
 18. David Farber, et al., How Right to Try State Laws Create False Expec-
tations, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20150522.047884/full (May 22, 2015). 
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with very significant potential implications for our regulatory 
system.19  
Some people who see government paternalism as problem-
atic nonetheless see a legitimate role for the FDA in addressing 
a particular kind of market failure rooted in information asym-
metries.20 On this account, because consumers know far less 
than companies about the safety and efficacy of drugs, “in the 
absence of mechanisms to signal and commit to the quality of 
drugs, the market for drugs may become a ‘market for lemons’: 
a smaller market in which only low quality drugs are sold, by 
non-trustworthy sellers.”21 Here, the FDA’s purpose is less to 
protect the public from dangerous drugs than to provide the pub-
lic with accurate signals about drug quality.22  
This view, too has been criticized. Richard Epstein, for ex-
ample, has argued that the need for certification cannot justify 
the breadth of the FDA’s powers, and particularly the power that 
the Agency has to ban products from the market.23 Epstein con-
tends that this power should be removed, and that the FDA 
should compete as a certifier with private-sector entities, such 
as trade associations or nonprofits.24 If the central aim of the 
Agency is simply to evaluate evidence that already exists, he ar-
gues, this work could be done by many entities.25 
The market-for-lemons justification has difficulty account-
ing for much of the power that the FDA has long wielded over 
drug companies. The paternalism justification seems difficult to 
square with what many people believe government respect for 
autonomy requires, particularly as regards the very ill. There is, 
however, a third and more powerful justification for the FDA’s 
power over drug marketing.  
As Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested, the FDA’s modern ap-
proach to drug regulation can best be understood through the 
 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See, e.g., HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION 
OF PHARMACEUTICALS 7 (1983). 
 21. Katz, supra note 13, at 11. 
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Epstein, supra note 14, at 3-4. 
 24. Id. at 4, 6–8. For responses to Epstein’s points, see Katz, supra note 13, 
at 34–36; and Ralph F. Hall, Right Question, Wrong Answer: A Response to Pro-
fessor Epstein and the “Permititis” Challenge, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 50 
(2010). 
 25. Epstein, supra note 14, at 4, 6–8. 
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lens of innovation policy.26 The account begins with the econom-
ics of information production. Pharmaceuticals are very complex 
products, whose effects can be understood only through sophis-
ticated and costly empirical studies. These studies often enroll 
hundreds or thousands of patients, and typically take many 
years and many millions of dollars to complete.27 Clinical trial 
results are also classic public goods: they are nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable.28 Unregulated markets are therefore likely to 
produce them in inadequate supply.29 Patents are one means of 
providing market incentives to produce trial data, but they pro-
vide asymmetric incentives. (Data and marketing exclusivities 
operate similarly to patents for these purposes.)30 An originator 
company holding a patent on a compound has reason to invest in 
positive evidence about a drug, because it can exclude others 
from recouping the benefits of the information by monopolizing 
the drug.31 But it also has high-powered incentives to avoid or 
hide negative information about the drug.32 
Competitors can profit by producing negative information 
about the originator’s drug but not to the same degree.33 They 
may sell a competing product, but there will often also be other 
competitors, meaning that there is a free rider concern: many 
 
 26. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 348. 
 27. AYLIN SERTKAYA ET AL., E. RESEARCH GRP., EXAMINATION OF CLINICAL 
TRIAL COSTS AND BARRIERS FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT 4-1 to 4-2 (2014), https:// 
aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/77166/rpt_erg.pdf (analyzing costs of clinical tri-
als for drug development). 
 28. Clinical trial results can be kept secret, but like many other information 
goods, their value cannot be realized without sharing them. 
 29. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation 
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 
1962) (“[F]or optimal allocation to invention[,] it would be necessary for the 
government or some other Agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to 
finance research and invention.”). 
 30. Marketing and data protection generate a term of exclusivity because 
they prevent registration of a generic unless the competing company conducts 
its own costly trials. Because they also reward invention via the market, they 
create a bias toward positive information. 
 31. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and 
the Limit of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1924 (2013). 
 32. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 370 (“[F]rom the perspective of the man-
ufacturer, rigorous clinical trials of off-label uses may be as likely to diminish 
the value of a particular product as to enhance it.”); see also Kapczynski & Syed, 
supra note 31, at 1923–28 (2013) (discussing these incentives, and the general 
problem that markets conditioned by exclusive rights have producing adequate 
negative information about products). 
 33. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 31, at 1927. 
 2364 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2357 
 
competitors can benefit if one of them invests in negative infor-
mation about a patented drug, but only one company benefits 
from positive information. And patents cannot solve the free 
rider problem here, because negative information about a drug 
is difficult to exclude even in the presence of patents.34 
The problem is not just theoretical. We now know of promi-
nent examples where companies have designed trials to avoid 
learning about potentially deadly side effects of their drugs. (As 
this reveals, the FDA has also not always been able to ade-
quately police the problem in practice.) Consider the history of 
rofecoxib (Vioxx), a pain-killer developed by Merck that became 
popular because it reportedly had fewer side effects than alter-
natives like aspirin.35 Early in the development process, Merck 
scientists raised concerns that the drug might have unintended 
cardiovascular side effects.36 Despite this, none of the studies 
Merck conducted for FDA approval “were designed to evaluate 
cardiovascular risk.”37 Merck also manipulated the presentation 
of its data in published studies to obscure evidence of increased 
cardiovascular risk.38 The drug stayed on the market from 1999 
to 2004, when it was “voluntarily” withdrawn.39 By that time, 
nearly 30,000 people had brought legal claims against the com-
pany for cardiac events that occurred while taking the drug.40 
 
 34. As Talha Syed and I describe: 
Positive information is easier to render excludable than negative infor-
mation, because of its closer nexus to a tangible, physical product. A 
company that sought to profit from a patent on negative information 
about a drug would need to track either thoughts or abstention from 
purchasing. Even if monitoring such intangibles across a large number 
of individuals were technically feasible, it is doubtful that such moni-
toring would be economically viable and, in any event, it would bump 
up against deeply entrenched privacy norms against invasive mental 
surveillance. 
Id. at 1926. Excludability, as we show, 
is highly variable across information goods, and is affected not only by 
formal legal entitlements, but also by existing technologies for detect-
ing or tracing such uses (and their costs); existing social norms regard-
ing “acceptable” or “reasonable” enforcement efforts (in light of con-
cerns about privacy, freedom of thought and speech, and so forth); and 
the existing institutions—or social roles, relations, and organizational 
forms—within which the predominant uses of the good will be made. 
Id. at 1903. 
 35. Harlan Krumholz et al., What Have We Learnt from Vioxx?, 334 BRIT. 
MED. J. 120, 120 (2007). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 121. 
 39. Id. at 122. 
 40. Id. at 120. 
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Such suits may create incentives to disclose negative infor-
mation earlier. But they operate ex post, and are contingent 
themselves on balanced information production—for how can 
plaintiffs show harm without evidence of such harm in the first 
place?41 In the Vioxx case, the key evidence was belatedly devel-
oped only through FDA oversight. Merck had to conduct new 
studies when it sought a new indication for the drug, and it was 
in this process that the company was pushed to study serious 
cardiovascular events.42  
Notice that the issue here is not that it is difficult to inter-
pret information about drugs without expertise. That is the point 
of the certification justification: there is a lot of information out 
there, and someone has to understand or translate it. Rather, 
the problem here is an information production problem. It is 
hard to generate that information in the first place, and in bal-
anced fashion, negative as well as positive. Marketing re-
strictions are the stick that complements the carrot provided by 
patents and data exclusivity.43 
There are many aspects of the FDA’s modern approach to 
drug regulation that become more intelligible when understood 
through the lens of information production.44 For example, the 
FDA restricts off-label marketing, but not off-label prescribing.45 
Drugs are approved for particular uses. Those uses are described 
on the drug label, which in turn defines the limits of a company’s 
legitimate marketing—but not a doctor’s legitimate prescribing. 
If a cholesterol drug is approved for use in individuals with a 
history of heart attacks, doctors may prescribe it to individuals 
who have no such history, and are at lower risk of cardiovascular 
events (for example, based on blood lipid levels). The company, 
 
 41. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 387 (“[G]iven that tort law places the 
burden of proof upon plaintiffs, drug manufacturers might minimize their lia-
bility exposure by remaining ignorant and keeping consumers ignorant of the 
effects of their products.”). 
 42. See Krumholz, supra note 35, at 121 & n.9 (noting that a clear safety 
signal was identified in the process of a supplemental new drug application, and 
that this led the safety board to “recommended that an analysis plan be devel-
oped to examine serious cardiovascular events”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 
5, at 378 (noting the role of the FDA). 
 43. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for 
Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1785 (2015). 
 44. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 349. 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Once FDA-approved, prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both 
FDA-approved and -unapproved uses; the FDA generally does not regulate how 
physicians use approved drugs.”). 
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however, may not market it for those purposes unless it proves 
to the FDA that its benefits outweigh the risks in that popula-
tion. 
From a paternalistic standpoint, this seems odd, or even dis-
criminatory. Off-label uses are demonstrably riskier than on-la-
bel uses.46 Drugs that are effective for one indication can be in-
effective or even harmful when used for another indication.47 
The risk-benefit ratio of a drug is also not the same for different 
populations: counterintuitively, when people have less severe 
disease, drugs often are more relatively risky, because the bene-
fits associated with the drug are smaller, but the side effects the 
same.48 This is one reason evidence of the benefits and risks of a 
drug must be considered anew for each indication. But as Eisen-
berg put it: 
If off-label uses of drugs threaten patient safety, then why permit 
them? On the other hand, if off-label uses do not threaten patient safety 
enough to prohibit them, then why not promote, rather than prohibit, 
the dissemination of any information about these uses that will help 
physicians make better choices for their patients?49 
The restriction on off-label marketing is puzzling if the pur-
pose of drug regulation is primarily paternalistic. But it makes 
sense from an information production standpoint. Restricting 
off-label marketing gives companies incentives to invest in de-
veloping evidence about new uses.50 Companies, unlike doctors, 
are in a good position to develop that data. They have expertise 
in trial design. They also typically hold patents or enjoy other 
 
 46. Jennifer R. Bellis et al., Adverse Drug Reactions and Off-Label and Un-
licensed Medicines in Children: A Nested Case-Control Study of Inpatients in a 
Pediatric Hospital, 11 BMC MED. 238, 238 (2013) (showing drugs prescribed off-
label for pediatric populations pose a 2.25 times higher risk of adverse effects 
than do drugs approved for use in children). 
 47. For example, tiagabine (Gabitril), approved to reduce the risk of sei-
zures in people diagnosed with epilepsy, in fact caused seizures in patients who 
were administered the drug for other disorders. See Charlene M. Flowers et al., 
Seizure Activity and Off-Label Use of Tiagabine, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 773, 773 
(2006). 
 48. The benefits of potent opioids, for example, may outweigh the risks for 
certain kinds of severe pain. But for those suffering chronic mild pain, the ben-
efits are smaller, and the risks—for example of addiction—relatively more sig-
nificant. See William B. Schultz, Trump’s New FDA Commissioner Has a 
Huge Decision to Make, WASH. POST (May 16, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-new-fda-commissioner-has-a-huge 
-decision-to-make/2017/05/16/4ee187f8-3667-11e7-b412-62beef8121f7_ 
story.html. 
 49. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 370. 
 50. Id. 
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kinds of exclusivity that can help them to recoup the costs of such 
research.  
Eisenberg points to several other aspects of the FDA’s ap-
proach to drug regulation that are also easier to understand from 
the perspective of information production. The FDA requires 
companies to produce much more extensive information about 
medicines than about dietary supplements before each can be 
marketed.51 Supplements can also be dangerous, so she argues 
that the difference makes sense less as an expression of pater-
nalistic values than as an expression of differing dynamics of in-
formation production. Dietary supplements are natural prod-
ucts, and so less amenable to patents.52 Using marketing 
restrictions to encourage evidence production about supple-
ments via the private market could plausibly push supplements 
out of the market rather than produce good evidence about sup-
plements.53 
Similarly, the FDA’s regime governing the use of experi-
mental drugs makes little sense from a paternalistic standpoint, 
but much more sense viewed through the lens of information pro-
duction. For example, in general, it is illegal for individuals to 
import medical products that are not approved in the United 
States,54 but the FDA provides a discretionary exemption for 
personal use in certain situations, such as when the product is 
for the treatment of a serious condition.55 It also allows individ-
uals who are seriously ill to choose to take experimental drugs 
via its compassionate-use program, and it approves nearly all 
 
 51. Id. at 379. 
 52. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
66 (“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patenta-
ble.”). 
 53. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 379–80. 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for in-
troduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an ap-
plication filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with 
respect to such drug.”). 
 55. Id. § 384(j)(1)(B) (allowing FDA to “exercise discretion to permit indi-
viduals to make such importations in circumstances in which—(i) the importa-
tion is clearly for personal use . . . and (ii) the prescription drug or device im-
ported does not appear to present an unreasonable risk to the individual”); 
Personal Importation, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ImportProgram/ 
ImportBasics/ucm432661.htm (last visited June 18, 2018) (describing criteria 
for personal importation of unapproved drugs). 
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such requests.56 But the FDA has historically not allowed com-
panies to market to patients in these same circumstances.57 This 
reflects less a commitment to protect patients from risk than it 
does a commitment to protect a system of evidence production. 
Drug companies are well situated to respond to marketing re-
strictions by producing evidence, but individual patients are not. 
Finally, notice one additional puzzle that the information 
production perspective can help resolve. If the FDA is needed 
merely to inform consumers, then it is hard to see—as Epstein 
argues—why it can go beyond certifying the effects of a drug, to 
ban a drug from the market altogether. But from an information 
production standpoint, power over marketing is essential. The 
ability to ban marketing is a stick that the FDA requires to en-
sure that companies produce balanced information about drugs 
and submit it to regulators for review. 
Shifting our focus to the domain of information production 
also allows us to see another market failure that the FDA seeks 
to solve, here related not to the production of evidence but to its 
validation. Unregulated markets can neither produce balanced 
information about drugs nor rigorously evaluate evidence pro-
duced about drugs. The notion that the FDA can serve as merely 
one certifier among many neglects two problems. One relates to 
secrecy and the other to financing. 
First, accurately evaluating clinical trial evidence requires 
access to all of the associated clinical trial data. But no entity 
other than the FDA has the right to demand access to all of the 
data associated with a drug, and no third party can expect rou-
tinely to receive it. Epstein seems to envision that third-parties 
will be able to consult the literature to make informed judgments 
 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (providing for expanded access to unapproved ther-
apies and diagnostics). According to a 2017 report by the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office, of the nearly 5800 expanded access requests received by the 
FDA from 2012 to 2015, the FDA allowed ninety-nine percent to proceed, and 
for emergency single-patient requests, the Agency typically responds within 
hours. GAO, GAO-17-564, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: INVESTIGATIONAL 
NEW DRUGS: FDA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM 
BUT SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY HOW ADVERSE EVENTS DATA ARE USED 17, 19 
(2017), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685729.pdf. 
 57. Ashley Ochs, A Study in Futility: Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs Will Not Expand Access to Experimental Drugs for the 
Terminally Ill, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 559, 570 (2009) (discussing the need for 
testing completion before marketing will be approved). For possible implications 
of the new federal right-to-try law on this restriction, see infra Part II. 
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about the value of medicines.58 About half of all completed clini-
cal trials, however, are not published.59 Recent evidence also 
suggests that the published literature is biased toward positive 
studies. In a 2008 paper, for example, researchers compared 
FDA reviews of antidepressant drugs with the published litera-
ture.60 Only one study that the FDA considered positive was not 
published.61 In all but three cases, however, studies that the 
FDA considered negative were not published at all or were pub-
lished and described as positive.62 With full access to the study 
results, a reviewer would have seen that around half of the stud-
ies were negative, while with access to only the published re-
sults, a reviewer would have believed that ninety-four percent of 
the trials conducted were positive.63 Reviewers relying on pub-
lished evidence will systematically overestimate the effective-
ness of medicines, if, as it appears, the literature is systemati-
cally skewed. 
The problem goes beyond publication bias. There are excel-
lent nonprofit groups, the Cochrane Group for example, that 
seek to generate neutral, expert evidence about the effects of 
drugs by conducting metastudies of all of the available trials.64 
Those studies are often considered the gold standard in meta-
research, and have had a significant influence on prescribing 
guidelines.65 But they are typically based on incomplete data.  
 
 58. See Epstein, supra note 14. 
 59. Carolina Riveros et al., Timing and Completeness of Trial Results 
Posted at ClinicalTrials.gov and Published in Journals, 10 PLOS 
MED. e1001566 (2013); Joseph S. Ross et al., Publication of NIH Funded Trials 
Registered in Clinicaltrials.Gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 
3 (2012). 
 60. Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials 
and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008). 
 61. Id. at 256 (table showing one (3%) unpublished positive study and 37 
(97%) published positive studies). 
 62. Id. (table showing sixteen (67%) unpublished negative studies, five 
(21%) published negative studies that conflict with FDA decision, and three 
(12%) published negative studies that agree with FDA decision). 
 63. Id. at 255 (“Overall, 48 of the 51 published studies were reported to 
have positive results (94%). According to the FDA, 38 of the 74 registered stud-
ies had positive results (51%).”). 
 64. See About Us, COCHRANE, http://www.cochrane.org/about-us (last vis-
ited June 18, 2018). 
 65. Marie Baudard et al., Impact of Searching Clinical Trial Registries in 
Systematic Reviews of Pharmaceutical Treatments: Methodological Systematic 
Review and Reanalysis of Meta-Analyses, 356 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2017). 
(“Systematic reviews are considered to provide the highest level of evidence . . . 
[and form the basis] of clinical practice guidelines . . . .”); Richard Smith, The 
Cochrane Collaboration at 20, 347 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2013) (“Many see 
 2370 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2357 
 
The depth of the problem has only recently begun to be un-
derstood. For example, several years after the approval of osel-
tamivir (Tamiflu), a drug used to treat influenza, concerns were 
raised about the efficacy of the drug.66 The Cochrane Group pub-
lished a metastudy of the evidence that was largely positive,67 
but an outside researcher pointed out potential problems with 
some of the unpublished studies, and the Cochrane reviewers de-
cided to undertake further investigation.68 The company, Roche, 
was unwilling to turn over the data underlying the unpublished 
trials that the reviewers requested.69 Eventually, after four 
years of work that included a public campaign for release of the 
data by a prominent medical journal, the researchers were able 
to access all published and unpublished data, and conducted an 
updated review.70 They reversed their earlier findings, and con-
cluded that the drug could not be affirmatively recommended to 
reduce symptoms.71 The group also recommended further 
study—but unlike the FDA, had no tools to press the company to 
comply. 
The example shows the issue in stark relief: we now know 
that the gold standard for clinical metaresearch is often based 
on incomplete information—information that may also be sys-
tematically biased, because it too must typically rely substan-
tially on publicly available data. Groups like Cochrane have no 
entitlement to access data held by companies, and they obtain 
secret data only rarely and with great effort. The FDA, in con-
trast, does have that entitlement.72 It receives enormous quan-
tities of data that companies do not make public. These include 
 
Cochrane reviews as the gold standard, and the collaboration has played a ma-
jor role in promoting evidence based practice.”). 
 66. Tom Jefferson et al., Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and 
Treating Influenza in Healthy Adults: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 
339 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 5–7 (2009). 
 67. Id. at 2 (noting that the review “found positive evidence” with regard to 
the ability of neuraminidase inhibitors to prevent or ameliorate influenza, to 
interrupt transmission of the virus, and to reduce influenza related complica-
tions). 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Peter Doshi, Neuraminidase inhibitors—the story behind the Cochrane 
review, 339 BMJ 5164, 5194 (2009). 
 70. TOM JEFFERSON ET AL., COCHRANE DATABASE SYST. REV. 
NEURAMINIDASE INHIBITORS FOR PREVENTING AND TREATING INFLUENZA IN 
ADULTS AND CHILDREN (REVIEW) (2014) (reviewing all the clinical study reports 
of published and unpublished clinical trials). 
 71. Id. at 2–6. 
 72. Amy Kapczynski & Jeanie Kim, Clinical Trial Transparency: The FDA 
Should and Can Do More, 45 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 33, 33 (2018). 
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trial protocols (necessary to interpret data produced in trials), 
summaries of trial results (such as the clinical study reports that 
companies prepare for the Agency), and the underlying analyza-
ble datasets—none of which are routinely available to research-
ers.73 
FDA reviewers may also query applicants for more data and 
dig deeper into the record to validate and—if needed—correct 
data. For example, after postmarket safety concerns emerged in 
association with the diabetes medicine rosiglitazone (Avandia), 
the FDA conducted a manual review of adverse event forms sub-
mitted to the Agency, collected additional data for hundreds of 
trial participants, and found a number of deaths that had not 
previously been recorded.74 This is a good example of the extraor-
dinary complexity of trial evaluation. Just a few missed deaths 
in a trial—stemming from inadequate follow-up, or misreporting 
that is either accidental or deliberate—can translate into hun-
dreds or even thousands of deaths in a population, once a drug 
is widely prescribed.  
One solution to this problem is simple transparency.75 In 
practice, transparency has been anything but simple. Companies 
resist turning over protocols, summary data, and especially an-
alyzable datasets to researchers, citing concerns about commer-
cial confidentiality as well as patient privacy.76 The FDA has 
long repeated these concerns and released most such data only 
after protracted litigation via FOIA—and some not even then.77 
The FDA and drug companies are likely wrong that clinical trial 
data relevant to the assessment of the safety or efficacy of a drug 
categorically should be considered commercially confidential and 
kept secret.78 Where manufacturers’ concerns are genuine and 
 
 73. Id. at 34 
 74. FDA, Joint Meeting of the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advi-
sory Comm. and the Drug Safety and Risk Mgmt. Advisory Comm., Readjudi-
cation of the Rosiglitazone Evaluated for Cardiovascular Outcomes and Regu-
lation of Glycemia in Diabetes Trial (RECORD) (June 5–6, 2013); Kenneth W. 
Mahaffey et al., Results of a Reevaluation of Cardiovascular Outcomes in the 
RECORD Trial, 166 AMERICAN HEART J. 240, 242 (2013).  
 75. Eisenberg suggests this, for example. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 
383. 
 76. Kapczynski & Kim, supra note 72, at 34. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws 
and Secrecy In Medical Research: Improving Public Access To Data on Drug 
Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483, 487–88 (2007); see also Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. 
Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1919) (“[ I ]t is too plain for argument that a man-
ufacturer or vendor has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving to 
 2372 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2357 
 
not contrary to the public’s interest in understanding the quality 
of a product—where, for example, companies wish to protect in-
formation about manufacturing processes—the information in 
question can readily be redacted.79 (There are also accepted pro-
tocols for sharing data while protecting patient privacy.)80 But 
there is undoubtedly an awkward fit between a profit-motivated 
system for clinical data development and the call for radical 
transparency. Moreover, even if all data routinely given to the 
FDA were made available to outside researchers, those research-
ers would not have the right that FDA reviewers have to demand 
a response, and more data, from companies. Even the most am-
bitious transparency agenda cannot give private entities the 
powers possessed by the FDA without turning them, in effect, 
into decentralized and smaller versions of a regulatory Agency. 
Even if the access-to-data problem were solved, the financ-
ing of validation efforts would still be an issue. The expense as-
sociated with rigorous validation of study results is substantial. 
The FDA’s Office of New Drugs, for example, has a staff of more 
than 1000.81 New drug approval packages submitted to the FDA 
routinely run in the hundreds of thousands of pages, and analy-
sis of this data demands a great deal of expertise and time.82 
While groups like Cochrane or formulary committees may have 
the capacity to consult the published literature and, in rare 
cases, seek some additional underlying summary data, this is 
the very tip of the clinical data iceberg. The FDA reviews not 
only clinical data from all trial phases, in primary as well as 
 
the purchaser fair information of what it is that is being sold. The right of a 
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be 
held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise of its police power and in 
promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of the product be fairly set 
forth.”); Epstein, supra note 14, at 34 n.135 (declaring support for “the publica-
tion of trade secret information needed to evaluate serious health risks”). 
 79. Kapczynski & Kim, supra note 72, at 34. 
 80. Id. at 33. 
 81. Zachary Brennan, FDA’s Office of New Drugs Director to Retire, RAPS 
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/12/05/26301/ 
FDA%E2%80%99s-Office-of-New-Drugs-Director-to-Retire. 
 82. Publication and Disclosure Issues in Antidepressant Pediatric Clinical 
Trials: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 36–37 (2004) (statement of Janet 
Woodcock, Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-108hhrg96094/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg96094.pdf (noting that raw data 
from drug submissions runs in the “hundreds or thousands of volumes” and that 
“there are very few individuals who are capable of going through all that at that 
level”); see also id. at 179 (Statement of John R. Hayes, Product Team Leader, 
Eli Lilly Company) (“We recently had a new drug application that was 417,000 
hard copy pages for a single indication.”). 
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summary form, but also evaluates animal studies, pharmacoki-
netic information, and postmarket adverse events.83 Given their 
limited capacity, third-party groups like Cochrane focus on a 
limited set of drugs and primarily consult secondary sources ra-
ther than the voluminous primary data. Academics have little 
reason to do reanalysis of this sort, because it is unlikely that 
any particular study will generate new knowledge, and replica-
tion studies are difficult to publish if they indeed validate the 
initial results.84  
Might insurance companies take on a larger role in validat-
ing studies, because it would serve their interest in “controlling 
drug costs,” as Eisenberg wonders?85 Not likely, and certainly 
not at the scale undertaken by the FDA. First, there is a classical 
principal-agent problem: insurers have reason to focus only on 
clinical evidence associated with high cost drugs, and have in-
centive to find fault with them in order to deny coverage. Collec-
tive action issues present another problem: if insurers were to 
invest in hiring hundreds of staff members to undertake the 
same work that the FDA undertakes and share the results pub-
licly, other insurers could free ride. If they kept the results a se-
cret—perhaps difficult, given patients’ need to understand the 
basis for coverage decisions—then their work could not serve the 
role of public validation of the quality and safety of drug prod-
ucts. 
The FDA, in sum, plays a critical role in the production and 
validation of information about medicines—one that is essential 
to the production of balanced evidence about the harms and ben-
efits of medicines, and to the intensive work needed to evaluate 
the studies that companies conduct. The reason that we apply 
this regime to medicines and not to all products has to do with 
the substantial risks and benefits associated with drugs, and in 
this way the Agency’s role is fundamentally about protecting the 
public. But the Agency protects the public not by making choices 
for it or by certifying the truth but by generating and validating 
information about medicines. These aims, moreover, are inter-
 
 83. Lee et al., Publication of Clinical Trials Supporting Successful New 
Drug Applications: A Literature Analysis, 5 PLOS MED 191, 191 (2008). 
 84. YALE COLLABORATION FOR RESEARCH INTEGRITY & TRANSPARENCY, 
PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: WHY AND HOW 9–10 
(2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/crit/crit_white_paper_ 
november_2017_best_promoting_transparency_in_clinical_research_why_and_ 
how.pdf. 
 85. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 374. 
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twined: if no entity had the resources to closely monitor the con-
duct and results of trials, it would be trivially easy for companies 
to slant the data or summaries in favor of their products. Both 
tasks are critical, and neither can be performed adequately by 
an unregulated market. 
II.  WHY RECENT REFORMS THREATEN THE FDA’S 
INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND VALIDATION 
FUNCTION   
From this perspective, we can see better why so-called right-
to-try laws and recent First Amendment cases are so troubling. 
We can also see the enormous stakes of how the FDA implements 
its new authority under the 21st Century Cures Act.86 Changes 
that reduce the power of the FDA’s stick, as these do, threaten 
our system for producing and validating evidence about medi-
cines. 
Prior to the new right-to-try law, federal statutes and regu-
lations already provided a pathway for patients to access unap-
proved compounds.87 Under that approach, patients with a seri-
ous or life-threatening disease can request permission from the 
FDA to use an unproven therapy if they cannot access other sat-
isfactory approved treatments or a clinical trial.88 The FDA 
grants ninety-nine percent of all such requests.89 Companies, 
however, routinely refuse to supply investigational drugs to pa-
tients, leaving many who are seriously ill without the ability to 
access compounds that they wish to try.90 Experts commonly 
have cited two reasons that companies do not more frequently 
grant patient requests. By regulation, companies may not profit 
from expanded access uses.91 Providing drugs to patients who 
are often sicker than the typical intended population also risks 
 
 86. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 87. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2017). 
 88. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a); Expanded Access: Information for Patients, 
FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ 
ucm20041768.htm. 
 89. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Ten-Year Experience for the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, Part 2: FDA’s Role in Ensuring Patient Safety, 51(2) 
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 246, 246 (2017). In eleven percent of the 
cases, the FDA also requested changes to protect patients, suggesting that the 
Agency’s review provides important input to patients and companies. Id. at 248. 
 90. See Alison Bateman-House et al., “Right to Try” Won’t Give Patients Ac-
cess to Experimental Drugs. Here’s What Will, HEALTH AFFAIRS: BLOG (May 3, 
2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170503.059926/full. 
 91. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1) (limiting a company’s recoverable costs to “direct 
costs”). 
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additional adverse events that may mar the record of an un-
proven therapy and make approval more complex.92 
State and federal right-to-try laws were promoted—most 
prominently by the Goldwater Institute—as a way to increase 
access to experimental therapies.93 The recently passed federal 
version allows patients with life-threatening diseases or condi-
tions to bypass the existing expanded access process.94 It forbids 
the FDA to use any data arising from uses under the new path-
way to negatively impact drug approval decisions, with certain 
narrow exceptions.95 The law also limits liability for companies 
and prescribers “unless the relevant conduct constitutes reckless 
or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort un-
der any applicable State law.”96 Because it does not explicitly re-
strict what companies can charge, some argue that the law 
“open[s] the door for companies to profit from selling unproven 
drugs.”97 The law does refer to existing FDA regulations that 
permit companies only to charge “direct costs,” but these regula-
tions might be changed.98 
The law’s provisions mainly target the FDA, despite the fact 
that the Agency has not been the main barrier to access.99 The 
 
 92. See Bateman-House et al., supra note 90. 
 93. See id.; see also Goldwater Inst., supra note 15.  
 94. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel-
lina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(a)(1)(A); see 
also Alison Bateman-House & Christopher T. Robinson, The Federal Right to 
Try Act of 2017—A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path 
Forward, 178 JAMA Internal Med. 321, 321 (2018) (summarizing the Senate 
Bill, S 204, that was the basis for the adopted law). The law applies to medicines 
that are in development and have completed only the most minimal (phase I) 
tests. Pub L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(a)(2)(A). Phase I trials give no infor-
mation about efficacy and provide only preliminary information on safety, typi-
cally drawn from tests on healthy volunteers rather than in persons with the 
disease. See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Ef-
fective, FDA (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/ 
consumers/ucm143534.htm. 
 95. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(c)(1) (“[T]he Secretary may not 
use a clinical outcome associated with the use of an eligible investigational drug 
pursuant to this section to delay or adversely affect the review or approval of 
such drug [unless the sponsor requests it or the Secretary finds it] is critical to 
determining the safety of the eligible investigational drug.”).  
 96. Id. at sec. 2(b)(1)(B). 
 97. Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 94, at 321.  
 98. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(b) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1)). 
 99. Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 94, at 321. In addition to the 
FDA’s rapid review and approval of almost all requests, when the FDA receives 
reports of adverse events in the expanded access program, it considers them in 
context and gives them very little weight in the approval process. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR 
 2376 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2357 
 
law also explicitly states that companies have no obligation to 
provide patients with access to experimental therapies.100 It will 
therefore likely do little to help patients.101 But by further limit-
ing the FDA’s role in the process, it may mean that patients end 
up with less information about medicines. If new regulations 
permitted companies to profit from unapproved uses, the results 
would be more troubling still. Companies would have less incen-
tive to quickly complete trials to gain approval. 
Once we appreciate the importance of marketing re-
strictions in our system of producing information about drugs, it 
becomes clear that the push to deregulate access to experimental 
therapies comes along with grave risks. More targeted ap-
proaches that seek to reduce the administrative burden of the 
existing expanded access program, and to improve patients’ and 
companies’ understanding of the process, would better serve pa-
tients’ need for treatment, while also protecting their need for 
answers.102 
 
TREATMENT USE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 18–19 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm351261.pdf. (“In a very small number of cases, 
[FDA has used] adverse event information from expanded access [in the safety 
assessment of a drug] . . . . FDA reviewers of these adverse event data under-
stand the context in which the expanded access use was permitted [(e.g., use in 
patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or administered 
in a clinical setting (not clinical trial)] and will evaluate any adverse event data 
obtained from an expanded access submission within that context . . . . Ex-
panded access INDs (Investigational New Drugs) and protocols are generally 
not designed to determine the efficacy of a drug; however, the expanded access 
regulations do not prohibit the collection of such data. Because expanded access 
INDs or protocols typically involve uncontrolled exposures (with limited data 
collection), it is unlikely that an expanded access IND or protocol would yield 
efficacy information that would be useful to FDA in considering a drug’s effec-
tiveness.”). 
 100. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(b)(2). 
 101. See, e.g., Bateman-House & Robinson, supra note 94; see also Vibhav 
Rangarajan, The “Cruel Joke” of Compassionate Use and Right to Try: Pharma 
Companies Don’t Have to Comply, STAT NEWS (June 5, 2018), https://www 
.statnews.com/2018/06/05/right-to-try-compassionate-use-pharma-compliance. 
Even if companies were eventually allowed to charge for such medicines, if in-
surance coverage is not mandated for such uses, patients will likely have diffi-
cultly covering the costs on their own. Most state laws explicitly say that insur-
ance plans are not required to cover experimental uses. Kearns & Bateman-
House, supra note 17, at 171. 
 102. Bateman-House et al., supra note 90 (recommending a series of changes 
of this sort, including improved communication, and eliminating the require-
ment for an institutional review board to review requests for individual pa-
tients). 
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The recent First Amendment cases are similarly troubling 
once we have in view the role that the FDA’s restrictions on mar-
keting play in information production and validation. Commer-
cial speech has long received only limited constitutional protec-
tion, but recent Supreme Court cases have begun to blur the 
lines between commercial speech and more protected public or 
political speech.103 In response to these cases, lower courts have 
begun to call into question the constitutionality of the FDA’s 
longstanding approach to evidence production as applied to off-
label uses.  
As described above, under current law, to be permitted to 
market a drug for a particular use, a company must first produce 
data that the drug is safe and efficacious for that use and submit 
such data to regulators. A recent Second Circuit case, United 
States v. Caronia, suggested that this longstanding approach 
may today be unconstitutional.104 The majority viewed the pri-
mary aim of the Agency’s restriction on off-label promotion as 
protecting patients from unsafe medicines.105 It concluded that 
marketing restrictions did not “directly advance” an interest in 
patient safety because if this is the government’s aim, it makes 
little sense to permit off-label prescribing but forbid off-label pro-
motion.106 It concluded that the FDA could restrict marketing 
that it could show to be false or misleading, but that it could not 
constitutionally restrict marketing merely because it is off-la-
bel.107  
The Second Circuit left open additional arguments that the 
Agency may make in its defense,108 though these were rejected 
in a subsequent district court case, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. 
FDA.109 In that case, a company that made a pharmaceutical de-
rived from fish oil wished to market it broadly for an unapproved 
 
 103. See Sorrell v. IMS, 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).  
 104. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162–69 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 105. Id. at 153. 
 106. Id. at 166–67 (“Prohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use ‘paternalistically’ in-
terferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially rele-
vant treatment information; such barriers to information about off-label use 
could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment de-
cisions.”). 
 107. Id. at 168–69. 
 108. See id. at 162 n.9 (noting that the government might have argued, but 
had not in this case, that off-label promotion was merely being used as evidence 
of mislabeling). 
 109. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
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use, despite the FDA’s conclusion that there was no reason to 
think that the product provided any clinical benefit for the use 
in question.110 The court interpreted Caronia to imply that re-
strictions on off-label marketing were flatly unconstitutional, 
and issued an order—on a preliminary injunction motion, with 
neither a full record nor expert testimony—effectively adjudicat-
ing the merits of the company’s marketing claims.111 The court 
concluded, for example, that the drug could be promoted to re-
duce the risk of coronary artery disease, despite the FDA’s objec-
tion that there was inadequate evidence to support such a use.112 
The FDA’s contrary conclusion drew on its expert review of a 
substantial body of evidence, including recent clinical studies of 
other drugs that operated in a similar fashion that showed no 
clinical benefit.113 
Amarin’s approach replaces expert FDA reviewers with fed-
eral judges who may have no training in science, and who have 
access to almost none of the data and evidence that drug review-
ers enjoy. Judges have neither the skills nor the data needed to 
adequately validate claims about medicines. And because the 
FDA’s validation role is intertwined with its evidence production 
role, Amarin’s logic also threatens to undermine the production 
of evidence about new uses. As I have described elsewhere, Am-
arin has implications for drug-approval strategy in the future: 
Once a drug is approved for any indication, it can be promoted to phy-
sicians for any use as long as a judge, not the FDA, views the marketing 
to be truthful and nonmisleading . . . . The Amarin decision invites a 
world where companies no longer pursue broad clinical indications for 
new drugs but instead seek the narrowest possible indication for ap-
proval and then market the drug for any new use for which there is 
some evidence, no matter how weak. Companies would no longer have 
to conduct rigorous trials and submit, to the FDA, data demonstrating 
the safety and efficacy of new uses. Such an approach would compro-
mise the future evidence base for medicines, expose patients to a 
greater risk of adverse events, and increase pharmaceutical spending 
without evidence that the expenditures would help improve patients’ 
health.114 
 
 110. Id. at 198.  
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Fortunately, Amarin is only a district court opinion. The 
Second Circuit might resolve differently the argument left open 
in Caronia, and other theories remain that might convince other 
appellate courts.115 But there is now significant pressure on the 
Agency to voluntarily relinquish its power over off-label uses, 
and there are some indications that it may be considering this 
approach.116 
The risks of this to the Agency’s information production and 
validation function, again, are substantial. If companies con-
tinue to press this line of cases, and courts agree, what might be 
done in response? It is worth noting that private industry is not 
the only entity that can fund clinical research. If substantial 
public funding were directed to study off-label uses, then addi-
tional marketing of such uses might be compatible with contin-
ued evidence production.117 
Finally, the impact of the 21st Century Cures Act is also 
clarified by an appreciation for the FDA’s information produc-
tion role. Broadly summarizing, the Act encourages the FDA to 
approve drugs more quickly and with less evidence.118 For exam-
ple, it urges the Agency to increase its reliance on “biomarkers 
and surrogate measures” in the drug approval process, along 
with “‘real world evidence’—observational data arising from rou-
tine clinical use, rather than prospectively collected data from 
randomized controlled trials.”119  
In theory, it may be possible to approve drugs with less evi-
dence, and gather more evidence after approval, when the drug 
is in use in the wider population. In part with this in mind, the 
FDA has already begun to employ forms of accelerated approval, 
and has increasingly relied on nonclinical endpoints as markers 
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of success.120 But there are costs as well as benefits of approving 
drugs on the basis of more preliminary trials, and neither has 
been well-characterized. For example, we know of many cases 
where early and small clinical trials suggested benefits but 
larger and more definitive trials revealed that drugs did not 
work or even caused harm.121 We do not yet know how repre-
sentative these examples are. Recent evidence also shows that 
drugs that are approved through accelerated pathways are more 
likely to be subject to serious postmarket safety warnings, indi-
cating that when the FDA accelerates its review this comes at 
some cost to patient safety.122 But again, we have little sense of 
how substantial these risks are on the whole, nor how large the 
associated benefits of faster review may be. 
The FDA has also already begun to use surrogate markers 
extensively.123 Surrogate markers can make trials faster and 
cheaper because they may be assessed more quickly or easily 
than clinical benefits. For example, a trial might measure cho-
lesterol levels instead of cardiovascular deaths, or tumor shrink-
age instead of survival time. But if these markers turn out not 
to correlate with clinical outcomes, approving drugs on this basis 
increases risks to patients (because drugs almost always have 
associated risks) and wastes scarce resources.  
Are scientists and regulators good at selecting surrogate 
markers? Existing studies give cause for concern.124 For exam-
ple, a recent systematic review of drugs approved by the FDA 
over a twelve-year period showed that for those approved on the 
basis of surrogate markers, “less than one-tenth . . . had a pub-
lished peer-reviewed post-market study establishing that the 
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drug was effective based on clinical evidence.”125 In other words, 
it is likely that many drugs currently approved on the basis of 
surrogate markers are never shown to be effective in clinical 
terms. In another study, the authors gathered twenty years of 
cardiovascular trials involving medicines and other interven-
tions that had been published in the most prominent medical 
journals.126 They selected those that used surrogate markers, 
and then searched the literature for follow on studies. Less than 
one-third all of the trials that showed a positive result for a sur-
rogate were even studied for clinical endpoints.127 More worry-
ingly still, when they were tested, half of the time surrogate 
markers that were thought to correlate with clinical benefit in 
fact did not.128 
If we are to expedite the FDA’s review process and employ 
more surrogate markers without compromising the FDA’s evi-
dence production and validation function, we must shift the reg-
ulatory system to require rigorous follow-on studies that can con-
firm or disprove early results. Companies are already required 
to conduct such studies in many cases, but here too, the early 
evidence suggests that the system isn’t working well. Post-mar-
keting studies are rarely completed on time.129 For example, in 
one study of twenty-two drugs that were subject to fast-track ap-
proval by the FDA from 2009 to 2013, only half of required fol-
low-up studies were completed within three years.130 More trou-
blingly still, these follow-on studies often also used surrogate or 
biomarkers, rather than clinically meaningful endpoints such as 
the alleviation of symptoms or improvements in morbidity or 
mortality.131 This suggests that currently the FDA is unable to 
require studies to be done in a timely fashion, or to require that 
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studies are done on the right outcomes. Whether this is the re-
sult of inadequate legal frameworks, insufficient resources with 
the Agency, or a more fundamental political economy problem 
with postmarketing requirements is not yet known. 
Patients, providers, and policymakers all want better medi-
cines, and want them faster. But clinical evidence production is 
complex and takes time. When implementing the 21st Century 
Cures Act, the FDA should exercise caution, and ensure that its 
approach is consistent with the Agency’s critical role in produc-
ing and validating high quality information about medicines. 
Moving forward to reduce the evidence required prior to ap-
proval without identifying why postmarketing studies are so of-
ten not completed in a timely fashion, and without assurances 
that the Agency has the tools and resources to address the prob-
lem going forward, seems ill-advised. 
  CONCLUSION   
The most persuasive justification for the FDA’s modern reg-
ulatory approach to drug marketing relates to the enormous 
challenges associated with producing and validating high-qual-
ity information about medicines. Unregulated markets cannot 
adequately perform either function, and modern FDA law is 
shaped substantially by this fact. Recent challenges to the 
Agency’s regulatory structure have not adequately addressed 
these issues. Facing them head on allows us to see that some of 
these reforms are plainly ill-advised, and that others should be 
stayed until we know better how to make them compatible with 
the FDA’s critical information production and validation func-
tions. 
